## Learning from Nisan's natural proofs

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## Natural Proofs (Razborov-Rudich, 1997)

#### Natural Proofs

Alexander A. Razborov\* School of Mathematics Institute for Advanced Study Princeton, NJ 08540 and Steklov Mathematical Institute Vavilova 42, 117966, GSP-1 Moscow, RUSSIA Steven Rudich<sup>†</sup> Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15212

#### Abstract

We introduce the notion of *natural* proof. We argue that the known proofs of lower bounds on the complexity of explicit Boolean functions in non-monotone models fall within our definition of natural. We show based on a hardness assumption that natural proofs can't prove superpolynomial lower bounds for general circuits. We show that the weaker class of  $AC^0$ -natural proofs which is sufficient to prove the parity lower bounds of Furst, Saxe, and Sipser; Yao; and Hastad is inherently incapable of proving the bounds of Razborov and Smolensky. We give some formal evidence that natural proofs are indeed natural by showing that every formal complexity measure which can prove super-polynomial lower bounds for a single function, can do so for almost all functions, which is one of the key requirements to a natural proof in our sense.

to be really hard such as the Riemann Hypothesis. Perhaps the ultimate demonstration that  $P \stackrel{?}{=} NP$  is a hard problem would be to show it to be independent of set theory (ZFC).

Another way to answer this question is to demonstrate that known methods are inherently too weak to solve problems such as  $P \stackrel{?}{=} NP$ . This approach was taken in Baker, Gill, and Solovay [4] who used oracle separation results for many major complexity classes to argue that relativizing proof techniques could not solve these problems. Since relativizing proof techniques involving diagonalization and simulation were the only available tools at the time of their work progress along known lines was ruled out.

Instead, people started to look at these problems in terms of non-uniform (= Boolean) complexity. Along these lines, many (non-relativizing) proof techniques have been discovered and used to prove lower bounds

### A style or type of circuit lower bound

## All known circuit lower bounds at the time were natural proofs, or could be made so



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## All known circuit lower bounds at the time were natural proofs, or could be made so

Why care? We should understand whether this technique could be used to separate **P** and **NP**, or whether other techniques are needed.

Precedent for concern: Baker, Gill and Solovay's prior work on relativizing proofs







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### **Natural Proofs and Properties** (Razborov-Rudich, 1997) Lower bounds that <u>encode</u> algorithms

Natural Proofs of lower bounds against circuit class  $\Lambda$  identify Natural Properties

**Large:**  $Q_n$  is at least 1/4 the size of  $F_n$ 

**Useful:** If  $f \in \Lambda_n$ , then  $f \notin Q_n$ 

**Constructive:** The predicate "is  $f \in Q_n$ " can be computed in polynomial time (in the size of the truth table)



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This is the algorithm



Hard functions live here

## **Power of Natural Properties** A distinguisher?

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$$\Pr_{f \sim f_n} \left[ A(tt_f) = 1 \right] - \Pr_{f \sim \Lambda_n} \left[ A(tt_f) = 1 \right] \ge \frac{1}{4}$$
  
This is the algorithm

### **Natural Proofs** (Razborov-Rudich, 1997) Lower bounds that <u>are self-defeating</u>

Natural Proofs of lower bounds against circuit class P/poly break strong one-way functions (And basically all of cryptography)

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### Sketch:

## **OWF —> PRF** (HILL, `99 / GGM, `86)

**Large** implies that a random truth table is accepted by the property with probability > 1/4

**Useful** implies that PRFs are never accepted

**Constructive** implies that given query access to the PRF, we can actually **run the algorithm efficiently** 

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## Learning from Natural Proofs

(Carmosino-Impagliazzo-Kabanets-Kolokolova, 2016)

Natural Proofs of lower bounds against circuit class P/poly imply that P/poly is **learnable**. This is stronger than just breaking PRF.



## Sketch:

**Use queries** to map the unknown function to a truth table TT. Queries are derived from NWgenerator (Nisan-Wigderson, 1994) -very intricate.

### Large, Useful and

**Constructive** implies that given query access to the table, we can run the natural proof to obtain a distinguisher for TT, which then becomes A learning algorithm by unwinding NW.



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## Learning from Natural Proofs



## **Open Question:**

Can we use "random examples" — not queries — and can we get  $\Lambda$  that doesn't contain  $AC^{0}[2]$ ?

(Carmosino-Impagliazzo-Kabanets-Kolokolova, 2016)

- Uses very intricate queries stemming from hardness amplification procedures and Nisan-Wigderson generator
- Hypothesis circuit only approximates over the uniform distribution (from hardness amplification procedure)
- Only applies to  $\Lambda$  that contains  $AC^{0}[2]$ (constant depth, unbounded fan-in, And/Or/ Not circuit
  - An artifact of the proof of CIKK Nisan-Wigderson generator is  $AC^{0}[2]$ -local but not  $AC^0$ -local s with MOD2 gates)

## PAC-learning (original model)

Unlabelled examples  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  are sampled according to any unknown distribution

$$h: \frac{1}{2}0, 13^{n} \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}0, 13$$

$$\Pr\left[\Pr\left(\frac{Pr}{x \sim p} \left[\frac{h(x) \neq f(x)}{y}\right] \le \epsilon\right] \ge 1 - 5$$

$$\left[\Pr\left(\frac{1}{x \sim p}\right)\right] = \frac{1}{2} \left[\frac{1}{x \sim p}\right]$$



## **Open Question, Rephrased**

# h: 30,13 -> 30,13 Pr $h(x) \neq f(x) \leq 6$ > 1-5 $\mathbf{P}$ Let $\Lambda$ be any circuit class. Do Natural Proofs useful against $\Lambda$

- -circuits of size exp(n) imply polynomial time learning algorithms for poly(n) size  $\Lambda$ -circuits, in the original PAC-learning model?

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x; ~ Un (uniform over {0,13")

Probably not! And this follows from a simple but under-the-radar observation.

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So why probably not?

Nisan (1993) proved lower bounds against exponential size depth-2 majority circuits

Nisan's proof is *Natural*. (If you look hard, you can find references to this as early as (Raz, 2000), but we are the first to explicitly formalize)

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**But:** Klivans-Sherstov (2009) show that depth-2 majority circuits are not PAC-learnable, under Lattice-based cryptographic assumptions.

"Yes, for every  $\Lambda$ " breaks crypto!



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So, what kind of learning can we "reasonably" expect to follow from natural proofs, in full generality?

We can start by considering Nisan's natural proofs specifically.







## Nisan's natural proofs

## So what is Nisan's natural proof method?

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Isolate a function F with very high communication complexity like  $\Omega(n)$  in 2-party randomized model There are many such functions (e.g. Inner product mod 2)

Consider the candidate circuit class  $\Lambda$  you would like to prove the lower bound for.

- Show that every Ckt in  $\Lambda$  (size s(n)) has a CC protocol of complexity k(s(n))

2. Conclude that F does not have  $\Lambda$ -circuits of size g(n), where g(k(s(n))) =  $\Omega(n)!$  ..... (By contradiction)

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E.g.: (Nisan, 1993). Depth-2 Maj-circuits of size s(n) have a randomized CC protocol of complexity k(s(n)) for k = O(log(.))

Thus, IPmod2 requires Depth-2 Maj-circuits of size  $\exp(\Omega(n))$ !

## Informal main theorem of this work (K., 2024)

Any circuit class  $\Lambda$  (size s(n)), which has a g(n) lower bound via Nisan's method, has a "Distributional PAC-learning" algorithm that runs in time  $exp(g^{-1}(s(n))).$ 

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This gets around the impossibility by considering: a) Any p-samp **<u>distribution</u>** over concepts Complexity of *evaluation of concepts*, not concepts themselves b) C)

Turns out this is essentially best possible, if you further inspect the hardness of learning result of (Klivans-Sherstov, 2009)

- Non-black box usage of lower bounds (Nisan's specific techniques!)

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Recall concrete example: depth-2 majoritycircuits of size poly(n) have and exp(n) lower bound.



## Distributional PAC-learning (K., 2024)

Just like PAC-learning, but "Bayesian"

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
P_{r} \\
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## Distributional PAC-learning (K., 2024)



Just like PAC-learning, but "Bayesian"

There are lots of independent benefits of distributional PAC-learning!

• it allows black-box boosting (Schapire 1990) • other avg-case learning models do not • still related well to theory of cryptography • (Kearns-Valiant, 1994) hardness still goes through • we can consider interesting  $f \sim \mu$  anyways • Hardness with fixed  $x \sim \rho$  (p-samp) implies OWFs



**Open Question** 

Let  $\Lambda$  be any circuit class. Do Natural Proofs useful against  $\Lambda$ -circuits of size exp(n) imply polynomial time learning algorithms for poly(n) size  $\Lambda$ -circuits, in the original PAC-learning model?

> Left out so far is that CIKK16 actually **invokes** their implication from natural proofs to query learning using the existing natural proofs against  $AC^{0}[p]$  by (Razborov-Smolensky, 1987)

**Even with encoded inputs** 

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One of the motivations of Open Question is to perhaps rule out conjecture weak PRFs in  $AC^0[2]$  (Boyle et al., 2021)

DistPAC-learning is enough to rule out weak PRFs. Thus we **invoke** our theorem with Nisan's natural proofs to rule out weak PRFs evaluatable by depth-2 majority circuits, in a very strong way.

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Weak PRFs often suffice for crypto One of the motivations of Open Question is to applications (whereas *strong* PRFs are weak PRFs in  $AC^0[2]$  (Boyle et al., 2021) overkill). There's a well motivated research direction to find the absolute minimum hardware (e.g. size of low-DistPAC-learning is enough to rule out weak P depth circuits) that compute wPRFs. theorem with Nisan's natural proofs to rule out weak depth-2 majority circuits, in a very strong way.

**Even with encoded inputs** 







DistPAC-learning rules out weak PRFs. Thus we rule out encoded-input weak PRFs by depth-2 majority circuits, in a very strong way.

**Even with encoded inputs. Analogous to BIP+18** 

![](_page_33_Figure_2.jpeg)

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### Correlation bounds for randomized communication protocols (we provide a new application of this)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as

$$R_{2}(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_{1}^{0}, x_{2}^{0}, x_{1}^{1}, x_{2}^{1} \sim U_{n}} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_{1}, \varepsilon_{2} \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_{1}^{\varepsilon_{1}}, x_{2}^{\varepsilon_{2}}) \right]$$

## **Recall informal theorem:**

Any circuit class  $\Lambda$  (size s(n)), which has a g(n) lower bound via Nisan's method, has a "Distributional PAC-learning" algorithm that runs in time  $exp(g^{-1}(s(n)))$ .

Core technique (K., 2024)

#### **Exploit HOW the natural proofs works.**

![](_page_35_Figure_9.jpeg)

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#### **Evaluation Functions:**

 $\operatorname{Eval}(\pi_f, x) \to f(x)$ 

Induces a concept class:

 $C_{\text{Eval}} = \{ \text{Eval}(\pi_f, \cdot) : \pi_f \in \{0, 1\}^{s(n)} \}$ 

Concept distribution  $\mu$  is thus thought of as over  $\{0,1\}^{s(n)}$ 

Core technique (K., 2024)

#### **Exploit HOW the natural proofs works.**

![](_page_36_Figure_12.jpeg)

Exploit *HOW* the natural proofs works.

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Now let's think of R2 norms of evaluation functions Fix  $\mu$ (over concepts),  $\rho$ (over inputs)

**Eval**: **Input:** string r, string z Take  $\pi_f = \mu(r), x = \rho(z)$ **Output:** f(x)

Equivalent to sampling from  $\mu / \rho$  when r / zare uniformly random strings

Core technique (K., 2024)

Eval  $(\pi, x_i)$ Eval (T, x2)  $\pi_1^{\sim} \mu$  $f_{\pi_i}(x_i)$ Eval (TL2, X2  $Eval(\pi_2, \varkappa_1)$ (2) $\pi_2 \sim \mu$  $f_{\pi_2}(x_i)$  $f_{\pi_2}(x_2)$  $x_1 \sim \rho$  $\mathbf{X} \sim \mathbf{A}$ 

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as  $R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right]$ (2)H,:=  $r_i \sim U$  $r_2 \sim U$  $r_3 \sim U$  $r_{y} \sim U$  $E_{val}(\pi, x)$ H<sub>2</sub>:=  $r_2 \sim U$  $r_3 \sim U$  $r_{y} \sim U$  $= f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i})$  $\begin{aligned} & E_{val}(\pi_{i}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i}, x_{i}) \\ &= \\ & f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) & f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{aligned}$  $H_3 :=$  $r_3 \sim U$  $r_{y} \sim U$  $f_{\pi_1}(x_2)$  $Eval(\pi_1, x_1) = Eval(\pi_1, x_2)$  $\operatorname{Eval}(\pi_2, \varkappa_1)$ H<sub>4</sub> :=  $r_{y} \sim U$ =  $f_{\pi_i}(x_i)$ =  $f_{\pi_1}(x_2)$  $f_{\pi_2}(x_i)$  $Eval(\pi_1, x_1) = Eval(\pi_1, x_2)$  $\operatorname{Eval}(\pi_2, \varkappa_1)$   $\operatorname{Eval}(\pi_2, \varkappa_2)$ *H<sub>s</sub>* := =  $f_{\pi_1}(x_1)$ = Ξ =  $f_{\pi_1}(x_2)$  $f_{\pi_2}(x_i)$  $f_{\pi_2}(x_2)$ 

$$\pi_{1} \sim \mu$$

$$= = = f_{\pi_{1}}(x_{1}) \quad F_{\pi_{1}}(x_{2})$$

$$= f_{\pi_{1}}(x_{1}) \quad f_{\pi_{1}}(x_{2})$$

$$= f_{\pi_{2}}(x_{1}) \quad E_{val}(\pi_{2}, x_{2})$$

$$= f_{\pi_{2}}(x_{1}) \quad f_{\pi_{2}}(x_{2})$$

$$(x_{1} \sim \rho) \quad (x_{2} \sim \rho)$$

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f : (\{0,$ 

### "Hybrid argument"

 $R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1}$ 

![](_page_39_Picture_3.jpeg)

bits is in expectation 0, of course

$$1 J^{n})^{2} \rightarrow \{-1, 1\}, \text{ the 2-party norm of } f \text{ is defined as}$$

$$J_{2} \sim U_{n} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_{1}, \varepsilon_{2} \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_{1}^{\varepsilon_{1}}, x_{2}^{\varepsilon_{2}}) \right] \qquad (2)$$

$$H_{1} := r_{1} \sim U r_{2} \sim U r_{3} \sim U r_{4} \sim U$$

$$H_{2} := r_{1} \sim U r_{3} \sim U r_{4} \sim U r_{4} \sim U$$

$$H_{2} := r_{1} \sim U r_{2} \sim U r_{3} \sim U r_{4} \sim U$$

$$H_{3} := r_{4} \sim U r_{4} \sim U r_{5} \sim U r_{5} \sim U r_{4} \sim U$$

$$H_{3} := r_{4} \sim U r_{4} \sim U r_{5} \sim U r_{5$$

### "Hybrid argument"

![](_page_40_Picture_3.jpeg)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as  $R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left| \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right|$ (2)

### "Hybrid argument"

![](_page_41_Picture_3.jpeg)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as  $R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left| \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right|$ (2)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f : (\{0, 1\}$ 

### "Hybrid argument"

 $R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim}$ 

![](_page_42_Figure_3.jpeg)

$$\begin{split} \|f^{n}\|^{2} &\to \{-1,1\}, \ the \ 2\text{-party norm of } f \ is \ defined \ as \\ &\sim_{U_{n}} \left[\prod_{\varepsilon_{1},\varepsilon_{2} \in \{0,1\}} f(x_{1}^{\varepsilon_{1}}, x_{2}^{\varepsilon_{2}})\right] \\ &(2) \end{split}$$
ommunication Can focus on the below 2 anyway.
(w.r.t. uniform) The expected parity of H4 is 0.
How do we know when 2-party norm is big?
(*The* correlation bound — [CT93, Raz00, VW07]). For every function  $f: (\{0,1\}^{n})^{2}$ 
Cor $(f, \Pi[2, c]) = \max_{\pi \in \Pi[2, c]} \left| \mathbb{E}_{x} [f(x) \cdot \pi(x)] \right| \leq 2^{c} \cdot R_{2}(f)^{1/4}$ 
*y* distributed over  $(\{0,1\}^{n})^{2}$ .

$$H_{i_{1}} := \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\ E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) \\$$

![](_page_42_Picture_6.jpeg)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as

$$R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right]$$

Correlation of f with communication protocols with cost c (w.r.t. uniform)

![](_page_43_Figure_3.jpeg)

$$H_{i_{1}} := \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{2}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) & f_{$$

![](_page_43_Figure_6.jpeg)

(2)

**Definition 1.2** (2-party norm). For  $f: (\{0,1\}^n)^2 \to \{-1,1\}$ , the 2-party norm of f is defined as

$$R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right]$$

Correlation of f with communication protocols with cost c (w.r.t. uniform)

![](_page_44_Figure_3.jpeg)

$$H_{i_{1}} := \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{2}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) & f_{$$

![](_page_44_Figure_6.jpeg)

(2)

Traditionally, Thm. 1.8 is used to prove that certain functions have little correlation with 2party protocols (w.r.t the uniform distribution over inputs)

By estimating a (low) R2.

So use contrapositive:

### When Eval correlates well with lowcommunication protocol, R2 is large!

![](_page_44_Picture_12.jpeg)

$$R_2(f) := \mathbb{E}_{x_1^0, x_2^0, x_1^1, x_2^1 \sim U_n} \left[ \prod_{\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in \{0, 1\}} f(x_1^{\varepsilon_1}, x_2^{\varepsilon_2}) \right]$$

![](_page_45_Figure_3.jpeg)

$$H_{i_{1}} := \begin{bmatrix} E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{1}}, x_{i}) & E_{val}(\pi_{i_{2}}, x_{i}) \\ = \\ f_{\pi_{i}}(x_{i}) & f_{$$

![](_page_45_Picture_5.jpeg)

![](_page_46_Figure_0.jpeg)

# Actually implementing this in the

![](_page_47_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_47_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_47_Picture_2.jpeg)

## Actually implementing this in the distributional PAC-Learning model

A randomized predictor with weak advantage  $\approx \gamma 2^{-c}$ 

![](_page_47_Figure_6.jpeg)

What can be evaluated with low communication?

Super simple example:

Distributions over decision trees given an "Anchor" tree

Evaluation function defined by Anchor tree reads from both the concept representation **and** the input

Hence, the sampling of the concept representation natural induces a randomized pruning of the anchor, i.e., a distribution over decision trees

![](_page_48_Picture_6.jpeg)

What can be evaluated with low communication?

Super simple example:

Distributions over decision trees given an "Anchor" tree

Evaluation function defined by Anchor tree reads from both the concept representation **and** the input

Hence, the sampling of the concept representation natural induces a randomized pruning of the anchor, i.e., a distribution over decision trees

![](_page_49_Picture_6.jpeg)

What can be evaluated with low communication?

Super simple example:

Distributions over decision trees given an "Anchor" tree

Evaluation function defined by Anchor tree reads from both the concept representation **and** the input

Hence, the sampling of the concept representation natural induces a randomized pruning of the anchor, i.e., a distribution over decision trees

![](_page_50_Picture_6.jpeg)

Super simple example:

Distributions over decision trees Also: given an "Anchor" tree Evaluation function defined by Anchor tree reads from bot Depth2 majority circuits the concept representation Intersections of halfspaces and the input • DNFs

Hence, the sampling of the concept representation natural induces a randomized pruning of the anchor, i.e., a distribution over decision trees

#### What can be evaluated with low communication?

ANCHOR TREE

## **"Organic" distributions over:**

## **Future directions**

Some obvious ones

 What other interesting "organic" distributions over concepts can be learned using this technique?

Statistical study of distPAC-learning?

distPAC-learning of AC0[2]?